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A DISTANT HERITAGE: THE GRowTH OF FREE SPEECH IN EARLY
AMERICA. By Lany D. Eldridge. New York: New York University
Press. 1994. Pp. xv, 198. $37.50.
To state the obvious, the right to free expression occupies an im-
portant place in modem U.S. law. The extraordinary significance of
this right leads naturally to scholarly attempts to find its origin in U.S.
history, out of both a sense of curiosity and a desire to learn from the
past. InA Distant Heritage, Larry Eldridge' looks for the origin of the
right to free expression in the formative days of our republic, specifi-
cally in the laws and legal practices of the seventeenth-century
colonies.
Eldridge's explicit purpose is to rebut the "resilient orthodoxy," an
orthodoxy that he attributes to Leonard Levy,2 that "no political free
speech existed in seventeenth-century America" (p. 1). Eldridge
claims to have made the startling discovery that American colonists in
the 1600s "experienced a dramatic expansion of their freedom to criti-
cize government and its officials across the seventeenth century" (p. 3).
This expansion was grounded in a "foundation laid deep and firm in
colonial experience" (p. 142). Indeed, for later colonists who led the
revolt against Britain, American colonial practices in the 1600s consti-
tuted nothing less than "a tradition of freedom passed down from the
time of their parents' grandparents" (p. 142).
These are broad claims - claims too ambitious for even Eldridge's
truly impressive historical research to substantiate. Readers expecting
to find in Eldridge's book an explanation of the early colonial origins
of the First Amendment's protection of free expression will be
disappointed.
Eldridge begins A Distant Heritage with a brief examination of co-
lonial controls on the broad range of activities that modem authorities
would now consider exercises of the right to free expression. Seven-
teenth-century colonial authorities placed sharp limits on citizens' sex-
ual activities, dress, treatment of citizens belonging to higher social
1. Assistant Professor of History, Widener University.
2. See p. 1 (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 20-28 (1985)). In my
view, Eldridge slightly misinterprets Levy. Levy does not state that there was no political free
speech in the colonies in the 1600s; rather, he claims that "liberty of expression barely existed in
principle or practice in the American colonies during the seventeenth century." LEVY, supra, at
28 (emphasis added). Expression covers a much broader range of activity than does speech, espe-
cially if one follows Eldridge in understanding the word speech to be limited in this context to
spoken words, as opposed to expressive actions, printed words, and religious practices. See p. 2.
Levy sought to capture the mood of colonial law on all aspects of freedom of expression. El-
dridge's book, in contrast, focuses on the comparatively narrow issue of freedom to criticize the
government orally on political issues.
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classes, and attitudes toward members of the opposite sex (pp. 5-7).
By reviewing colonial controls on this wide range of activities, El-
dridge illustrates that seditious speech laws were merely one part of a
broader colonial attempt to regulate citizen behavior in order "to
maintain a moral society" (p. 5).
Eldridge then proceeds to narrow his focus to seditious speech. He
distinguishes three types of seditious speech the utterance of which
colonial authorities punished: scandalum magnatum, government
criticism, and false news.3 According to Eldridge, scandalum
magnatum was the "slandering or scandalizing [of] great men in the
realm" (p. 10). Later discussion makes clear that scandalum
magnatum included at least two different types of offenses: personal
insults against particular citizens of great social or governmental stat-
ure (p. 43), and "misprision charges," or allegations of official incom-
petence, unfairness, or disloyalty (p. 45). The broad category of
government criticism included harsh words about the government
generally (pp. 28, 53-54), its statutes (pp. 28, 52), and specific exercises
of its power (p. 28). Rules against false news covered untrue words
about individual government officers as well as inaccurate reporting of
events.4
Within this discussion of the three types of seditious speech, El-
dridge pauses to note two interesting historical legal facts. First, in a
world ruled primarily by judge-made common law, many colonies
chose to regulate seditious speech by statute (pp. 23-31). Second, de-
spite their diverse religious and legal foundations, the various British
colonies "used strikingly similar statutes and methods to enforce [rules
against seditious speech]" and "demonstrated a notable consistency in
the types of punishments authorized against [such speech]" (p. 34).
Both results are surprising given that most law before the twentieth
century was common law and that states in this century have shown a
wide diversity in their treatment of seditious speech.5
After reviewing the colonial categories of seditious speech, El-
dridge briefly examines the nature of the colonial judicial process from
the point of view of an accused (pp. 67-91) before moving on to the
bulk of his interpretative analysis: a discussion of what he views as a
general trend during the seventeenth century among colonial authori-
ties toward treating seditious speech cases more leniently (p. 114). El-
3. P. 10. Eldridge makes clear that these categories are to some extent his own classifications
and that colonial authorities, while aware of some of the distinctions Eldridge identifies, often
lumped all or part of one category together with all or part of another in a single statute. See pp.
28, 145 n.12.
4. P. 58. Eldridge claims that colonial false news prosecutions tended to focus on inaccurate
reporting of events as opposed to false statements about government officials. P. 65.
5. See, eg., THE STATES AND SUBVERSION apps. A & B (Walter Gellhorn ed., 1952) (detail-
ing the variety of state laws against "subversive activities," including seditious speech, during the
McCarthy-Korean War era).
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dridge devotes one half of this analysis to the issue of punishment (pp.
91-113). The thesis of this section is that "colonial officials increas-
ingly abandoned a variety of harsher sanctions in punishing seditious
words, adopting in the process milder penalties as replacements" (p.
114). To prove his point, Eldridge divides punishments into six pri-
mary categories. The first, "bodily correction," consisted of physical
violence against the speaker and included ear cropping, breaking arms
and legs, tongue boring, and whipping (p. 91). The second category,
"humiliation punishments," included forcing a speaker to recant or
ask forgiveness, as well as imposing the pillory, the stocks, or the
wooden horse upon the defendant (p. 98). "Exclusion penalties," the
third punishment type, constituted banishing a convicted citizen or
barring such a person from voting or from holding public office (p.
104). Eldridge's fourth and fifth categories, incarceration and fines,
are self-explanatory. The sixth category included imposition of bonds
and sureties subject to forfeiture if the perpetrator misbehaved again
(p. 117).
Eldridge uses statistical analysis to demonstrate his contention that
the 1600s saw growing leniency in seditious speech cases. For the cat-
egories of bodily correction, humiliation punishments, exclusion pen-
alties, and imprisonment, Eldridge charts over time the number of
cases in which colonial authorities imposed each type of punishment
as a percentage of all seditious speech convictions for which the pun-
ishment is recorded (pp. 97, 103, 107, 112). Each of these charts
shows that colonial authorities relied upon these four types of punish-
ment with decreasing frequency as the seventeenth century progressed.
Eldridge charts a similar pattern of decline in the colonial imposition
of fines exceeding five pounds sterling as punishment for seditious
speech (p. 117). In addition, without a chart, Eldridge asserts that use
of the milder punishment of requiring offenders to post bonds or sure-
ties grew throughout the seventeenth century and that colonial author-
ities allowed offenders to guarantee smaller amounts over time (p.
122).
Eldridge points to three other developments to support his claim
that colonial treatment of seditious speech cases grew increasingly le-
nient during the 1600s. First, the author uses another statistical analy-
sis to show that the colonies less frequently imposed multiple
sanctions upon a single defendant as the seventeenth century
progressed (p. 123). Although Eldridge provides no chart, he asserts
that the number of seditious speech cases resulting in multiple punish-
ment constituted a diminishing percentage of the total number of sedi-
tious speech cases, a fall from approximately sixty-five percent to
about twenty percent from the 1630s to the 1690s (p. 123). Second,
Eldridge claims that colonial authorities showed an increasing ten-
dency to remit, pardon, suspend, or decrease sentences for violations
of seditious speech laws over the seventeenth century (p. 124). El-
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dridge again supports his point with an analysis of the relevant per-
centages across time (p. 126). Third, the author states that colonial
authorities "revealed a growing inclination not to prosecute seditious
words fully as the century progressed" (p. 126). To support this final
contention, Eldridge provides a number of sample cases in which colo-
nial authorities dropped seditious speech prosecutions at various
stages of the legal proceedings and concludes that the vast majority of
such cases occurred after 1660 (pp. 126-31).
A Distant Heritage finishes with a short chapter speculating on the
forces that led to growing leniency in the treatment of violations of
seditious speech laws. Eldridge attributes the change in the seven-
teenth century to a peculiar evolution of the colonial understanding of
the purposes behind seditious speech law. The author argues that co-
lonial authorities gradually abandoned the traditional concern for the
honor and dignity of nobles and great persons in favor of a focus on
"dangerous contexts" (pp. 133-34). Eldridge does not define the term
dangerous context, but his emphasis on rebellion and disturbance of
the peace seems to suggest that the phrase refers to a situation's poten-
tial to produce physical violence.6 In Eldridge's view, this evolution
constituted a colonial concern for "actual," as opposed to "theoreti-
cal," danger (p. 137).
Eldridge concludes his final chapter with an examination of the
historical trends that might have led to the change in colonial under-
standing of the purposes of seditious speech law. The author points to
a "fascinating confluence of historical developments" (pp. 3-4) that
undermined traditional respect for political and social authority
figures including colonial governments, religious figures, extended
family members, and local officials (pp. 138-42). Specifically, Eldridge
credits this trend to infighting between colonial legislatures and gover-
nors, a growing sense of religious toleration brought about by the pres-
ence of different religious faiths in the same community, the ready
availability of land, and economic dependence upon exports (pp. 138-
42).
In A Distant Heritage, Eldridge seeks to produce a "systematic
analysis of early colonial freedom of expression" focusing primarily on
seditious speech cases (p. 3). To this end, Eldridge examines a wide
variety of historical sources, including records of county, provincial,
and town courts in fifteen different jurisdictions, minutes of councils
and assemblies, and journals, diaries, and letters of state officials (p. 3).
The result is a book rich in examples and anecdotal evidence that pro-
vides an intriguing snapshot of various characteristics of colonial soci-
ety, from its tendency to keep only summary records to its
6. See pp. 134-35.
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extraordinary emphasis on religion and social class. These examples,
together with Eldridge's dry wit and appreciation for the bizarre,7
make the book humorous and readable.
The persistent problem with A Distant Heritage is that the evidence
upon which Eldridge relies does not support his conclusions to the
exclusion of other plausible explanations. This difficulty infects nearly
all of the conclusions of A Distant Heritage. The result is that El-
dridge's truly impressive historical research leads to no certainty at all
about whether in fact colonists in the seventeenth century experienced
an expansion of their right to criticize the government.
In his discussion of punishments, for example, Eldridge relies upon
a statistical analysis to show that extremely harsh types of punishment
fell into disuse in seditious speech cases as the seventeenth century
progressed. As a preliminary matter, one might question Eldridge's
choice to rely upon statistical analysis. Eldridge himself recognizes
that "court records are notoriously incomplete" and that "[m]any rel-
evant records have been lost or destroyed, and even in their original
state they omitted much important information" (p. 2). In addition,
given the different types of sources upon which Eldridge relies,8 one
can question whether the "records" of the seditious speech cases con-
tained within these sources can be meaningfully compared. Finally,
Eldridge does not subject his numbers to any sort of test for statistical
relevance, and thus one can question whether the evidence shows a
statistically significant trend.
Nevertheless, even if one disregards these preliminary difficulties
with Eldridge's statistics regarding punishment and accepts Eldridge's
assertion that colonial authorities tended to impose harsh punishments
with less frequency in seditious speech cases throughout the 1600s,
these numbers do not prove that colonial authorities acted leniently in
seditious speech cases. Eldridge's data is equally consistent with the
conclusion that colonial authorities imposed these harsh penalties less
often in all types of cases as the 1600s progressed. Eldridge might be
perceiving the roots of the Eighth Amendment, not the First. The
author's conclusions might ultimately be correct, but without compar-
ing punishment in seditious speech cases to punishment in all types of
cases, one cannot say conclusively that his statistics prove a trend to-
ward colonial leniency in seditious speech cases.
The argument regarding the exclusion of other possible explana-
tions applies equally to Eldridge's reliance upon decreasing colonial
tendencies toward imposing multiple punishments in seditious speech
7. In one instance, for example, Eldridge quotes a colonial record recounting that one
Thomas Graunger was ordered hanged "'for buggery with a mare, a cow, two goats, diverse
sheep, two calves, and a turkey."' P. 5 (quoting PLYMOUTH COLoNY RECORDS 2:449 (1642)).
Eldridge comments, "Graunger's creativity, it would seem, matched his energy." P. 5.
8. See p. 3.
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cases and remitting those sentences that were imposed. This argument
does not apply with any real force, however, to Eldridge's assertion
that colonial authorities tended not to prosecute violations of seditious
speech laws. Here, on the other hand, the statistical problems noted
earlier become especially severe, for Eldridge apparently relies on a
mere twenty-six dropped prosecutions to prove his point. These
twenty-six prosecutions provide questionable evidence of a trend sup-
posedly occurring in over thirteen different jurisdictions during a one-
hundred-year period.9
Eldridge's conclusions do not fit his data well in other ways. For
instance, Eldridge points to several historical trends leading to a gen-
eral decrease in citizen respect for authority to explain the trend to-
ward colonial leniency in seditious speech cases (pp. 138-42).
However, the idea that authorities might react to increasing citizen
defiance with growing leniency is somewhat counterintuitive; it cer-
tainly seems contrary to modem experience. In addition, Eldridge
does not explain why the increasing leniency took the form of lighter
punishments, as opposed to a change in the substantive law of sedi-
tious speech. Again, Eldridge might be correct in his assertions, but
he does not fully explain how his evidence leads to his conclusions.
Given the incomplete state of the historical records and the result-
ing difficulty in collecting enough data on any particular type of case
to support real empirical analysis, one might wonder whether a statis-
tical approach is a particularly effective way of considering free speech
law in the 1600s. The most convincing parts of A Distant Heritage are
not its statistics but its discussions of the change in the substantive law
of seditious speech that occurred during the seventeenth century. For
instance, Eldridge shows convincingly that colonial false news prose-
cutions tended to focus on the false reporting of events as opposed to
false stories about important persons and that colonial authorities
changed their response to violations of these laws from searching for
the original perpetrator to issuing official proclamations of the truth
(pp. 58-65). Eldridge recounts another similar development when he
shows how colonial authorities changed their reaction to allegations of
wrongdoing or unfairness in office from immediate prosecution of the
speaker to investigation into the truth of the allegations (p. 65). The
importance of these revelations does not depend on statistics showing
trends; rather, these examples from history are valuable because they
demonstrate explicitly how colonial authorities adapted the substan-
tive law of seditious speech to changing circumstances. This kind of
historical analysis - based on concrete examples of categorical
9. Perhaps Eldridge in fact relies upon a more complete statistical analysis to support this
point. The difficulty is that Eldridge does not reproduce any of his raw data to allow the reader
to check his conclusions, nor does he clearly describe his criteria for analyzing and classifying his
data. Given the incomplete state of colonial records, these omissions alone are enough to make
one doubt many of Eldridge's conclusions.
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change in the law - allows a historian to draw more reliable conclu-
sions from meager or incomplete records than does the use of
statistics.
A Distant Heritage thus ultimately does not prove what it intends
to prove - that the 1600s saw a relaxation of seditious speech law in
the colonies. Nevertheless, future researchers will find fruitful avenues
of research in the book, and students of the history of the freedom of
expression will find A Distant Heritage worth reading.
_ Jim Greiner
